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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
DEAN E. CONDER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, a body cor-
porate and politic and WILLIAM J. 
O'CONNOR, WARD C. HOL-
BROOK, CLARENCE BAMBER-
GER, ADAMS. BENNION, HEBER 
BENNION, ALBERT R. BOWEN, 
WALTER E. COSGRIFF, LeROY H. 
COX, REED C. CULP, SPENCE S. 
ECCLES, RICHARD L. EVANS, 
MRS. ]. L. GIBSON, FULLMER H. 
LATTER, ORRICE C. McSHANE, 
and A. RAY OLPIN, acting as the 
BOARD OF REGENTS of said Uni-
versity, 
Defendants, 
Case No. 7863 
DEFE~~TS' BRIEF 
PREFATORY STATEMENT 
This is an original action commenced in this court by 
plaintiff to restrain the University of Utah, a body politic and 
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corporate, and its Board of Regents from proceeding further 
in a proposed issuance of University of Utah Dormitory Rev-
enue Bonds in the principal amount of $1,000,000 pursuant 
to a Loan Agreement with the United States of America, 
Housing and Home Finance Agency. It is before the Court on 
defendants' motion to dismiss the alternative writ of prohi-
bition because the petition fails to state a claim against the 
defendants upon which relief can be granted. The questions 
to be decided are: (a) Will a pledge of the university's land 
grant interest violate Utah's "restricted special fund theory"?; 
(b) Can land grant interest be used to defray the cost of con-
structing buildings?; (c) Does the Board of Regents as pres 
ently constituted have the power to authorize the issuance, 
execution and delivery of said bonds? 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
This brief is directed to five points: 
I. THE DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN THE BOND 
ISSUE CONTEMPLATED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF 
UTAH AND THAT PROPOSED BY OGDEN CITY IN 
FJELDSTED V. OGDEN CITY, 83 UTAH 278, 28 P.(2D) 
144, MAY BE SUFFICIENT TO TAKE THE UNIVER-
SITY'S CASE OUT FROM UNDER THE "RESTRICTED 
SPECIAL FUND THEORY" ADOPTED IN THE FJELD-
STED CASE. 
II. THE LANGUAGE OF THE COURT IN STATE V. 
CANDLAND, 36 UTAH 406, 104. PAC. 285, WHICH 
SEEMINGLY BRINGS THE BOND ISSUE NOW CON· 
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TEMPLATED BY THE UNIVERSITY SQUARELY WITH-
IN THE PROHIBITION OF THE "RESTRICTED SPECIAL 
FUND THEORY'' IS PURE DICTA AND NOT BINDING 
UPON THE PRESENT COURT. 
III. THE "RESTRICTED SPECIAL FUND THEORY" 
ADOPTED IN THE FJELDSTED CASE SHOULD BE RE-
CONSIDERED AND REPUDIATED AS CONTRA TO THE 
OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF AUTHORITY AND 
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE BEST REASONING. 
IV. THE UNIVERSITY'S LAND-GRANT INTEREST 
MAY LAWFULLY BE USED FOR THE ERECTION OF 
BUILDINGS. 
V. THE BOARD OF REGENTS, AS THEN CONSTI-
TUTED, HAD FULL POWER AND AUTHORITY TO 
CONTRACT WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FOR 
THE LOAN IN QUESTION. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I 
THE DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN THE BOND 
ISSUE CONTEMPLATED BY THE UNIVERSITY Of 
UTAH AND THAT PROPOSED BY OGDEN CITY IN 
FJELDSTED V. OGDEN CITY, 83 UTAH 278, 28 P.(2D) 
144, MAY BE SUFFICIENT TO TAKE THE UNIVER-
SITY'S CASE OUT FROM UNDER THE "RESTRICTED 
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SPECIAL FUND THEORY" ADOPTED IN THE FJELD-
STED CASE. 
In the Fjeldsted case the bonds were to be issued by a 
municipality. In the instant case the bonds are to be issued 
by a constitutional corporation. A limitation on municipal 
indebtedness is imposed by Sections 3 and 4, Article XIV, 
Constitution of the State of Utah. There are no such consti-
tutional· limitations on the amount of general indebtedness 
the University can assume. It is not embraced in the enumerated 
political agencies or subdivisions of Sections 3 and 4, Article 
XIV. If the University is considered, as was the University 
of Oregon in McClain v. Regents of the University et al., 
124 Ore. 629,, 265 Pac. 412, not as an independent legal entity 
but merely as an administrative agency of the State, it follows 
that in indebtedness of the University is an indebtedness of 
the State. However, it is a well-settled principal of law, 
according to an article by E. H. Foley, Jr., Director, Legal 
Division, Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works, 
in 4 Fordham Law Review at page 19, that a public corporation 
may be created as a distinct legal entity apart from the state 
creating it, the debts of which are the debts of the corporation 
and not debts of the state. Quoting from the same article at 
page 23, 
"Another application of the principle that obligations 
issued by an incorporated instrumentality of a state 
are not debts of the state may be found in the line of 
cases holding that bonds issued by state institutions do 
not constitute indebtedness of the state. This principle 
has been applied to permit the issuance of bonds by 
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state universities in Idaho ...., , Louisiana 48 , Minnesota 40 , 
New MexiC0 50, and Wyoming 111 , by state boards of edu-
cation in Georgia sa, Montana 53 , and Virginia 54 , by 
agricultural colleges in North Dakota and Oklahoma 55 
and by a state normal school and a state tuberculosis 
sanitorium in Montana 56• These cases rest partly on 
the ground that the bonds issued by a state institution 
are debts only of the institution, and not of the state, 
and partly on the ground that the bonds are payable 
out of a special fund raised from sources other than 
taxation. A recent case in Georgia rests its decision 
solely on the first ground57 and a decision in Oregon 
is based solely on the second ground, ss although most 
of the decisions are based on both grounds indiscrimi-
nately.so" 
en IDAHO CONST. art IV, § 18; State ex rei. Black v. State Board 
of Ed., 33 Idaho 415, 196 Pac. 201 ( 1921). 
4s La. Act. No. 145, 1876; Caldwell Bros. v. Board of Supervisors, 
176 La. 825, 147 So. 5 (1933). 
49 Minn. Law 1927, c. 442; Fanning v. University of Minnesota, 
183 Minn. 222, 236 N.W. 217 (1931). 
s1. Wyo. Laws Spec. Sess. 1933, c. 21; Arnold v. Bond, 34 P.(2d) 28. 
soN. M. Laws 1927, c. 47; State v. Regents, 32 N. M. 428, 258 Pac. 
571 (1927). SeeN. M. Laws Spec. Sess. 1934, c. 19. 
s2 Ga. Laws 1931, p. 20; State v. Regents, 175 S.E. 567 (Ga. 1934). 
sa Mont. Laws Extra Sess. 1933, c. 10; State ex rei Veeder v. State 
Board of Ed., 33 P. (2d) 516 (Mont. 1934); Mont. Laws 1927, 
c. 94; Barbour v. State Board of Ed., 92 Mont. 321, 13 P.(2d) 
225 (1932.) 
s4 Va. Acts Extra Sess. 1933, c. 49; Philips v. University of 
Virginia, 97 Va. 472, 34 S.E. 66 (1889). 
ss N.D. Laws 1929, c. 102; State ex rei. Kaufman v. Davis, 59 
N. D. 191, 229 N.W. 105 ( 1930); Okla. Laws 1931, c. 34, art. 6; 
Baker v. Carter, 25 P.(2d) 747 (Oklahoma 1933). 
56 Mont. Laws of Extra Sess. 1933, c. 7; State ex rei. Blume v. 
State Board of Ed., 34 P. (2d) 515 (Mont. 1934); Mont. Laws 
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Extra Sess. 1933, c. 22; State ex rei. Hawkins v. State Board of 
Examiners, 35 P.(2d) 116 (Mont. 1934). 
:;7 State v. Regents, 175 S.E. 567 (Ga. 1934). 
~s Ore. Laws 1927, p. 364; McClain v. Regents, 124 Ore. 629, 265 
Pac. 412 ( 1928). 
~u Some of the decisions, based on the ground that the bonds are 
payable out of a special fund, involve bonds payable, not out of 
revenues derived from the undertaking financed thereby, but bonds 
payable out of the ilflcome of lands granted by the Federal Govern-
ment for university purposes, or the permanent school fund resulting 
from the sale of such lands. State ex rei. Black v. State Board of Ed., 
33 Idaho 415, 196 Pac. 201 ( 1921); State v. Regents, 32 N. M. 428, 
258 Pac. 571 (1927); Arnold v. Bond, 34 P.(2d) 28 (Wyo. 1934); 
State ex rei. Blume v. State Board of Ed., 34 P. ( 2d) 515 (Mont. 1934). 
Contra: State ex rei. Haire v. Rice, 33 Mont. 365, 83 Pac. 874 (1906), 
aff'd, 204 U. S. 291 (·1907); State v. Candland, 36 Utah 406, 104 
Pac. 285, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1260 (1909); Roach v. Gooding, 11 
Idaho 244, 81 Pac. 642 ( 1905.) On the nature of the obligation im-
posed by the Federal Government, see Alabama v. Schmidt, 232 
U. S. 168 ( 1914,) per Holmes, J. 
The language of the Court in State v. Regents, 179 Ga. 
210, 175 S.E. 567, referred to in the previous note is as follows: 
··Bonds and other obligations similar to those involved 
in this case and proposed by state institutions have been 
considered by the courts of several states; and it 
has been generally held that if the institution is a 
distinct corporate entity, the resulting liabilities could 
not be treated as a debt of the state within the mean-
ing of the constitutional prohibitions or limitations 
in reference to state indebtedness. Baker v. Carter, 165 
Okla. 116. 25 P.(2d) 747; Fanning v. University of 
Minnesota, 183 Minn. 222, 236 N.W. 217; Alabama 
State Bridge Corp v. Smith, 217 Ala. 3·11, 116 So. 695; 
Caldwell Bros. v. Board of Supervisors, 176 La. 825, 
147 So. 5; State ex rel.. Black v. State Board, 33 Idaho, 
415, 196 P. 201; State v. Regents, 32 N. M. 428, 258 
P. 5 71. One exception to this general statement is to 
10 
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be found in the case of McClain v. Regents, 124 Or. 
629, 265 P. 412, in which it was held by the Supreme 
Court of Oregon that while the Regents of the Uni-
versity of that state was a corporation, it was yet a 
public corporation, and that any indebtedness incurred 
by it would be an indebtedness of the state. Upon this 
particular question that decision would seem not to be 
in accord with the current of authority, unless a dis-
tinction should be made in view of the statutes of that 
state." 
It should be noted that Georgia applies the restricted spec-
ial fund theory to municipalities but refuses to apply it to the 
university, Dortch v. Southeastern Fair Assoc., 182 Ga. 633, 
186 S.E. 685. 
In accord with said Georgia case is Board of Regents of 
University of Arizona v. Sullivan, 45 Arizona 245, 42 P.(2d) 
619. 
In an action brought to test the validity of a $1,250,000 
bond issue for the benefit of Louisiana State University, the 
Court said in Caldwell Bros. v. Board of Supervisors, 176 La. 
825, 147 So. 5: 
" ( 4) Under these statutory grants, defendant board 
clearly has the power to borrow money from the Re-
construction Finance Corporation, and, necessarily, to 
issue certificates in repayment of same for the purpose 
of construction of the necessary and useful buildings 
in question. The board does not intend, by any means, 
to pay these certificates out of its alimony from ad 
valorem taxes, or any funds it may receive in the future 
dedicated by law to a particular purpose, but entirely 
from profits from the Athletic Association, the dormi-
11 
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tories, the cafeterias, rentals received for the apart-
ments at the Old University campus, matriculation fees, 
etc., which, it is admitted, are adequate for the repay-
ment of the loan from the Reconstruction Finance Cor-
poration. 
( 5) It is therefore plain that neither section 1 of Act 
No. 7 of 1921 (Ex .. Sess.), nor section 15 of Act No. 
145 of 1876 authorizes defendant board to contract 
any debt or liability on behalf of the state, in violation 
of article 4, § 2, of the present Constitution ( 1921) ." 
The Board of Regents of the University of Idaho is a 
constitutional corporation, the same as the University of Utah. 
In a landmark case fixing the status of the University of Idaho, 
State ex rel. Black v. State Board of Education et al., 33 Ida., 
415, 196 Pac. 201, the Court said: 
" ( 4) It is admitted by the Attorney General, and we 
think correctly so, that the proceeds of federal land 
grants, direct federal appropriations, and private dona-
tions to the University are trust funds, and are not sub-
ject to the constitutional requirement that money must 
be appropriated before it is paid out of the state treas-
ury. Claims against such funds need not be passed 
upon by the Board of Examiners, and the moneys in 
such funds may be expended by the Board of Regents, 
subject only to the conditions and limitations provided 
in the acts of Congress making such grants and appro-
priations, or the conditions imposed by the donors 
upon the donations. Melgard v. Eagleson, 31 Idaho 
411, 172 Pac. 655; Evans v. Van Deusen, 31 Idaho 
614, 174 Pac. 122. 
If a claim against the regents is a claim against the 
12 
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state it must be presented to the Board of Examiners 
for approval. * * * 
That a claim against the regents is not a. claim against 
the state is finally disposed of in First National Bank 
of Moscow v. Regents, 26 Idaho 15, 140 Pac. 771, 
in the following language: 
"There is no merit in the contention that the district 
court was without jurisdiction and that the only juris-
diction to hear this case was in the Supreme Court. * * * 
The doctrine there announced (Moscow Hardware 
Company v. Regents and First National Bank v. Re-
gents, supra) is sound and consonant with the pro-
visions of the Constitution and statute, and is affirmed 
in so far as it applies to the Board of Regents of 
the State lJniversity." 
( 1) This necessarily follows for the reason that the 
Board of Regents is a constitutional corporation with 
granted powers, and while functioning within the 
scope of its authority is not subject to the control or 
supervision of any other branch, board or department 
of the state government, but is a separate entity, and 
may sue and be sued, with power to contract and dis-
charge indebtedness, with the right to exercise its dis-
cretion within the powers granted, without authority 
to contract indebtedness against the state, and in no 
sense is a claim against the regents one against the 
state." 
As stated at the beginning of this discussion, Ogden City 
in the Fjeldsted case had the power to incur a general obliga-
tion had it not been for the constitutional prohibition. Since 
states are immune from suit without their consent, the Uni-
versity has no such power to impose a legal obligation on the 
13 
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State of Utah. At most the only obligation it can impose will 
be solely moral and any bond issue of the Agricultural College 
or the University of Utah, under Chapter 126, Laws of Utah, 
1947, tends to impose such a moral obligation even if no 
land grant interest is pledged to pay it. 
In establishing the restriction upon the special fund 
theory of the Barnes case, the Court in the Fjeldsted case 
relied almost exclusively on Garrett v. Swanson, 216 Cal. 220, 
13· P. (2d) 725. Without expressly overruling the Garrett 
case, the California Court in Department of Water and Power 
v. Vroman, 218 Cal. 206, 22 P.(2d) 698 refused to apply 
the restriction to the Department of Water and Power, an 
etsablished charter department of the City of Los Angeles. In 
that case, revenue from an existing electrical system worth 
$86,000,000 was proposed to be pledged to secure repayment 
of $22,800,000 to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
for money to be borrowed to build transmission lines from 
Boulder Dam to Southern California. The Court said: 
·'We attach no particular significance to the first ob-
jection, as such, viz., that the loan agreement provides 
for the repayment of moneys to be borrowed by the 
department out of revenues from the existing electric 
system as well as from revenues for the transmission 
sysetm proposed to be constructed, and that thereby 
the constitutional provision is violated. If it has any 
importance it is in connection with the second objection 
which is to the effect that, although the moneys to be 
borrowed are payable only out of the power revenue 
fund, said fund may prove to be inadequate, and the 
general taxpayers may in that event be required to 
pay taxes to meet the sums to become due on the 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
general bonds of the city heretofore issued for the 
construction and acquisition of a municipal electric 
system, thus rendering the loan agreement and the notes 
to be issued pursuant thereto without the scope of the 
special fund doctrine to which this state is committed. 
See Shelton v. City of Los Angeles, 206 Cal. 544, 275 
P. 421; In re California Toll Bridge Authority (City 
and County of San Francisco v. Wentworth), 212 Cal. 
298, 298 P. 485; California Toll Bridge v. Kelly (Cal. 
Sup.) 21 P. (2d) 425. It would seem that the Shelton 
Case alone had placed the revenue funds under the 
control of the board definitely in the category of special 
funds, the obligations against which are not respon-
sive to section 18 of article 11 of the Constitution; but 
it is insisted that this court in Garrett v. Swanton, 216 
Cal. 220, 13 P.(2d) 725, has so limited the special fund 
doctrines as to exclude the present case from its ap-
plication. To this we cannot agree, and the cases are 
readily distinguishable. In Garrett v. Swanson the 
contracting party was the city, a governmental entity 
held directly submissive to the constitutional mandate. 
Here the contracting party, in so far as concerns the 
incurring of the indebtedness or liability, is not the city 
of Los Angeles, as a municipal corporation, but is an 
independent municipal agency not controlled by the 
constitutional provision." 
As recently as December 7, 1951, the Second District 
Court of Appeals in California in the City of Glendale v. 
Chapman, 238 P.(2d) 162 again refused to apply the restricted 
special fund theory where revenue from a $7,630,355.52 
existing water-works system was pledged to pay 210 revenue 
bonds of the par value of $100,000 each. The Court said: 
" ( 4) The amici curiae who appear in support of 
respondents contend that, although the moneys to be 
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received from the sale of the bonds are payable only 
out of the net earnings of the waterworks, should that 
fund prove to be inadequate, the general fund will 
be invaded and the taxpayer be required to pay the sums 
due on the bonds. In reason how could such claim be 
made? In Shelton v. City of Los Angeles, 206 Cal. 
544, at page 551, 275 P. 421, at page 424, Mr. Justice 
Shenk says this obligation "is not a financial one, in 
default of which the city would be required to dis-
burse the general funds of the city or other moneys 
derived from taxation." By the ordinance the revenue 
funds are set aside as a special fund whose obligations 
are not responsive to section 18 of Article XI. Depart-
ment of Water and Power v. Vroman, supra, 218 Cal. 
at page 219, 22 P. 2d 698; Shelton v. City of Los 
Angeles, supra; California Toll Bridge Authority v. 
Kelly, 218 Cal. 7, 21 P. (2d) 425. 
( 5) The marking of a fund for a special purpose 
by a municipality has given rise to the Special Fund 
doctrine to which the jurisprudence of this state is 
committed. Amici curiae contend that such doctrine 
has been so limited by Garrett v. Swanton, 216 Cal. 
220, 13 P.(2d) 725, as to render it worthless as support 
for petitioner. In Department of Water and Power 
v. Vroman Justice Shenk pointed out that in Garrett 
v. Swanton the contracting party was the city "directly 
submissive to the constitutional mandate," (218 Cal. 
206, 22 P.(2d) 704) and in California Toll Bridge 
Authority v. Kelly, 218 Cal. at page 14, 21 P.(2d) 
at page 427, the same learned justice suggests that in 
the Garrett case ·'The bonds were city bonds, and were 
not payable solely from the special fund created by 
segregation of the revenues for that purpose, but also 
from the general fund of the city in the event the 
special fund should be insufficient." The law gov-
erning the operation and disposition of a special fund 
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such as that established as the "Waterworks Revenue 
Bonds, Reserve Fund" is declared (ibidem) by Justice 
Shenk in the following: "These funds are special funds, 
and obligations payable solely from such funds do 
not constitute a debt within the meaning of the con-
stitutional limitation involved." See Briggs v. Green-
ville County, 137 S. C. 288, 301, 135 S.E. 153; Wright 
v. Hardwick, 152 Ga. 302, 109 S. E. 903; Alabama 
State Bridge Corporation v. Smith, 217 Ala. 3·11, 116 
So. 695. That subordinate municipal boards may con-
tract for payment of moneys from their special funds 
and that such contracts are not violative of section 
18 of Article XI of the constitution was, upon an ex-
tensive review of the authorities of other jurisdictions, 
declared to be the law of this state in Shelton v. City 
of Los Angeles. The contract of a city for the pay-
ment of money out of a special fund, such as is involved 
herein, may impose a strong moral obligation to ap-
prove a schedule of rates to discharge the principal 
and interest of the indebtedness as it becomes due. 
Such obligation is not of a financial character in de-
fault of which the city would be required to disburse 
its general funds derived from taxation." 
California seems to have receded from its former position 
restricting the application of the special fund doctrine. 
Certainly the imposition of a moral obligation, which is 
all that could be imposed upon the state in the instant case, 
is no longer a deterrent there. 
Section 2, Chapter 126, Laws of Utah, 1947, expressly says 
that income from remodeled existing buildings may be pledged 
to secure such a loan as is contemplated in instant case as well 
as income and revenues from sources other than legislative 
appropriations. 
17 
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POINT NO. II 
THE LANGUAGE OF THE COURT IN STATE V. 
CANDLAND, 36 UTAH 406, 104. PAC. 285, WHICH 
SEEMINGLY BRINGS THE BOND ISSUE NOW CON-
TEMPLATED BY THE UNIVERSITY SQUARELY WITH-
IN THE PROHIBITION OF THE "RESTRICTED SPECIAL 
FUND THEORY" IS PURE DICTA AND NOT BINDING 
UPON THE PRESENT COURT. 
In State ex rel. University of Utah v. Candland et al., 36 
Utah 406, 104 Pac. 285, Justice Frick, speaking for the Court, 
noted: 
"According to the last biennial report of the board 
of regents of the University of Utah to the governor, 
and of which we are authorized to take judicial notice, 
the estimated income from the proceeds of all land 
sales now amounts to $22,000 annually, or to $44,000 
for the years 1909 and 1910. The estimated income 
from all other sources, not including appropriations 
from the state for the years aforesaid, amounts to 
$28,000 more. The total estimated income from all 
sources, not including appropriations from state moneys 
raised by taxation, for the next two years is, therefore, 
$72,000, while the expenses of conducting and main-
taining the university alone, not including the other 
schools and institutions connected with it, for the next 
two years, were estimated at $318,000." 
and then went on to say: 
"Every dollar in excess of $72,000 derived from other 
sources must, therefore, be raised by a tax levied upon 
all the taxable property within the state, and must 
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be paid out of the state treasury. We mention this simply 
because it is clear that it would not change the result 
even though a portion of the $72,000 were appro-
priated and set aside for the payment of the principal 
and interest of the obligation in question. If the amount 
necessary to pay principal and interest were in fact 
taken from the income of the university, it would 
simply result in requiring the state to supply the 
amount so taken from its general fund for "general 
maintenance,'' and hence nothing would be gained, ~o 
far as the taxpayer is concerned, by making the obli-
gation payable out of the income before referred to." 
Those remarks of the Court were pure dicta. The legislative 
act before the Court authorized a loan of all, or a part of, the 
corpus of the landgrant fund and obligated the state to pay 
interest on the same from the state's general fund. Obviously, 
the act in question was unconstitutional. 
The dicta enunciated a restricted special fund rule for 
a state case on the theory that a pledge of land-grant interest 
will tend to impose a moral obligaton on the state to enhance 
its appropriations to the university. 
But a statute in Montana providing for the erection of 
state normal school buildings and for financing thereof by 
issuance of bonds and pledging earnings of the school plus 
one-half the income from the land-grant funds to pay for 
same was held not to be unconstitutional in State ex rei. 
Blume v. State Board of Education of Montana et al., 97 
Mont. 3 71, 34 P. ( 2d) 515, citing prior Montana cases. Like-
wise a statute in New Mexico authorizing the pledging of 
land-grant interest was held not to be unconstitutional in the 
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State v. Regents of the University of New Mexico, 32 N.M. 
428, 258 Pac. 571. 
In Arnold et al v. Bond, 47 Wyo. 236, 34 P.(2d) 28, 
brought to test the constitutionality of a Wyoming statute 
authorizing the University to pledge land-grant interest to 
secure a loan, the Court said: 
" ( 3) 2. Article 16 of the Constitution contains pro-
visions for the limitation of indebtedness. Section 1 
thereof provides: 'The state of Wyoming shall not, 
in any manner, create any indebtedness exceeding one 
per centum on the assessed value of the taxable· prop-
erty in the state, as shown by the last general assess-
ment for taxation, preceding; except to suppress in-
surrection or to provide for the public defense.' 
Section 2 thereof provides: 'No debt in excess of the 
taxes for the current year, shall in any manner be 
created in the state of Wyoming, unless the proposi-
tion to create such debt shall have been submitted to a 
vote of the people and by them approved; except to 
suppress insurrection or to provide for the public 
defense.' 
The question is whether either of these sections are 
violated by the legislation act in question and by the 
proposed loan. There is no such violation, of course, 
if the indebtedness is not a state debt, or if, by reason 
of the repayments to be made only out of the income 
of the University fund, liability thereon is limited 
so as not to be a charge on the taxpayers of the state. 
In the case of State ex rel. v. McMillan, 12 N. D. 
280, 96 N.W. 310, bonds issued by the trustees of a 
normal school were held invalid as being an obliga-
. tion of the state .The law in question in that case 
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provided that the interest should be paid out of the 
income from lands granted to the state for normal 
school purposes, and that, if such income should 
prove to be insufficient, the remainder should be paid 
out of the general fund of the state. In the case of 
State ex rel. v. Candland, 36 Utah 406, 104 P. 285, 
24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1260, 140 Am. St. Rep. 834, bonds 
issued for the erection of buildings at the Utah Uni-
versity were held invalid. The land board was author-
ized under the law to take $250,000 from the principal 
of the University fund and loan it to the University 
board. The income from the fund was, under the law, 
to be turned over to the board as usual, and the prin-
cipal and interest on the loan was directed to be paid 
out of any money in the hands of the board or appro-
priated for its use. It was held that the loan was an 
indebtedness of the state, and that the effect of the 
payments of principal and interest on the loan in the 
manner specified by the law meant merely that the 
taxpayers of the state would be compelled to make 
up that amount in some other way. The legislative 
act in the case at bar does not contain the specific 
and objectionable features above mentioned. The 
majority of courts have held that an obligation similar 
to that involved in the case at bar is not a debt of the 
state. State ex rel. Bickford v. Cook, 17 Mont. 529, 
43 P. 928; Stein v. Morrison, 9 Idaho 426, 75 P. 246; 
Lewis v. Brady, 17 Idaho 251, 104 P. 900, 28 L.R.A. 
(N.S.) 152; State ex rel. v. Collins, 21 Mont. 448, 
53 P. 1114; Barbour v. State Board, 92 Mont. 321, 
13 P.(2d) 225; State ex rel. v. Regents, 32 N. M. 
428, 258 P. 571; State ex rel. v. Clausen, 134 Wash. 
196, 235 P. 364, 366; Allen v. Grimes, 9 Wash. 424, 
3·7 P. 662; Fanning v. University of Minnesota, 183 
Minn. 222, 236 N.W. 217; Caldwell v. Board, 176 
La. 825, 147 So. 5. In McClain v. Regents, 124 Ore. 
629, 265 P. 412, the court held that, while the ob-
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ligation involved in that case, which was similar to 
that involved in th case at bar, was that of the state, 
it did not violate the constitutional provisions relat-
ing to limitation of indebtedness, in view of the fact 
that it could be paid only out of a particular fund. 
In the case of State ex rel. v. Clausen, supra, it ap-
pears that the Legislature authorized the issuance 
of bonds for the purpose of erecting a capitol building, 
the bonds, both principal and interest, to be paid 
only out of revenues derived from the grant of lands 
for capitol building purposes. The validity of the 
bonds was upheld. Holding that they did not create 
an indebtedness of the state, the court said: "The 
legislative act under discussion expressly provides that 
the princicpal and interest of the bonds authorized 
shall be payable only from revenues hereafter received 
from the lease and sale of the granted lands. In no 
possible way is the credit of the state involved. Not 
one dollar of its general property can be used to dis-
charge those bonds or the interest on them. Not one 
dollar of taxes can be put to that purpose. * * * Its 
(the state's) only obligation under this act is to see 
that all the revenues hereafter received from the lease 
or sale of the granted lands shall be applied towards 
the payment of these bonds and their interest. On no 
principle of law can it be said that under these cir-
cumstances any debt has been contracted 'by or on 
behalf of this state.' " 
The Court then distinguishes Rodman v. Munson, 
13 Barb. (N.Y.) 63, and Newell v. People, 7 N.Y. 
63, where bonds issued, to be paid out of a particular 
fund, were held to create a debt of the state, and pro-
ceeds to say: 'There the revenues pledged came from 
the operation of canals owned by the state in its pro-
priety capacity. Its reveneus when collected belonged 
to the state, and might be applied towards the dis-
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charge of any of its general obligations. Any amount 
of the funds so arising, which must go to the discharge 
of the ceitificates which were sought to be issued, would 
have been made up by taxation of the property within 
the state or of its people in some form of other. The 
situation here is very different. These granted lands 
do not belong to the state in the ordinary sense, and 
any moneys coming from them can be used only for 
the purpose of constructing capitol buildings. To us 
the distinction between those cases and this one is 
very clear.' 
In the case of State v. Regents of University, 32 N.M. 
428, 259 P. 571, 572, the regents were sought to be 
enjoined from issuing bonds or building purposes, 
payable only out of the income of the University land 
fund. The court said: 'The Attorney General argues 
that the proposed bonds are in effect the obligation 
of the state, and as such may be issued only in compli-
ance with the provisions of section 8 of article 9 of 
the Constitution, which requires that any law author-
izing any such debt shall provide for an annual tax 
levy sufficient to pay interest and provide a sinking 
fund, and each law shall be submitted to a vote of the 
people for approval, neither of which requirements 
have been complied with. The argument is unsound 
and based upon a false premise. * * * It (the Uni-
versity) proposes to contract with its bondholders 
that it will appropriate out of its income sufficient 
sums of money to pay interest and provide a sinking 
fund for the retirement of the bonds. It does not pro-
pose to mortgage its property in specie. It simply 
agrees to pay out of its income. How it can be said 
that this will be an obligation of the state, we cannot 
understand. This is simply a contract of the Uni-
versity to pay out of a designated fund when received. 
It is no more an obligation of the state than would 
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be the obligation to pay the salaries of the University 
faculty. The mere fact that the University is a creature 
of the state and one of its instrumentalities to carry 
out its governmental functions is not controlling. The 
state has given the University certain property rights 
and has authorized it to make use of the same in a 
certain manner. This the University is proposing to 
do, and we can see no objection to the same.' 
We are inclined to agree with the opinion of the 
majority of the courts. The legislative act in question 
here specifically provides that only the income from 
the University land fund, and not the general credit 
of the state or any property whatsoever except such 
income, shall be obligated under the loan. We do 
not see why we should not give this language its 
natural meaning, on construe the act as creating a 
greater obligation, moral or otherwise, than it pur-
ports to create, when the terms thereof are clearly 
known before the proposed loan is made. The argu-
ment that the taxpayers of the state will be compelled 
to make up the principal and interest paid out on 
the loan has, of course,force from a practical stand-
point and cannot be overlooked. Theoretically, the 
Legislature may, or may not, appropriate out of the 
general funds or otherwise the amount so to be paid. 
It is not theoretically compelled to do so. Of course, 
if the proposed loan were of such amount that as a 
result of it the Legislature would practically be com-
pelled to make up the payments under the loan by 
taxation in order that the University might be able to 
function as such in a reasonable way, a different ques-
tion would arise, and we should probably not be war-
ranted in that case to waive aside the objection here 
discussed merely because of the theoretical side of 
the question. But, as will be shown in another con-
nection, the loan is not of that amount.'' 
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POINT NO. III 
THE "RESTRICTED SPECIAL FUND THEORY" 
ADOPTED IN THE FJELDSTED CASE SHOULD BE RE-
CONSIDERED AND REPUDIATED AS CONTRA TO THE 
OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF AUTHORITY AND 
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE BEST REASONING. 
The restricted special fund theory was first established 
by City of Joliet v. Alexander (1902) 194 Ill. 457, 62 N.E. 
861. It was later repudiated at the place of its birth, Ward 
v. City of Chicago (1930) 342 Ill. 167, 173 N.E. 810; Maffitt 
v. City of Decatur ( 1926) 3;.2 Ill. 82, 152 N.E. 602. Missouri 
adhered to the theory in Bell v. City of Fayette (1930) 325 
Mo. 75, 28 S.W. (2d) 356, and repudiated it in Grossman v. 
Public Water Supply District No. 1 (1936) 339 Mo. 344, 
96 S.W. (2d) 701. _The apparent retreat of the California 
Court was discussed under Point No. 1. 
Jurisdictions which have specifically considered and re-
jected the restricted special fund theory are: Arizona: Guthrie 
v. City of Mesa (1936) 47 Ariz. 336, 56 P.(2d) 655; Califor-
nia: Department of Water and Power (1933) 218 Cal. 206, 
22 P.(2d) 698; City of Glendale v. Chapman (1951) 238 
P. (2d) 162; Colorado: Searle v. Haxtun ( 1928) 84 Colo. 
494, 271 Pac. 629; Florida: State v. Miami (193·3) 113 Fla. 
280, 152 So. 6; Boykin v. River Junction (1936) 124 Fla. 
827, 169 So. 492; Indiana: Underwood v. Fairbanks, Morse 
&Co. (1933) 205 Ind. 316,185 N.E. 118; Kentucky: Bowling 
Green v. Kirby ( 1927) 220 Ky. 839, 295 S.W. 1004; Security . 
Trust v. Paris (1936) 264 Ky. 846, 95 S.W. (2d) 781; Minne-
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sota: Struble v. Nelson (1944) 217 Minn. 610, 15 N.W. 
(2d) 101; Missouri: Grossman v. Public Water Supply District 
( 1936) 339 Mo. 344, 96 S. W. (2d) 701; Montana: State 
ex rel. Blume v. State Board of Education (1934) 97 Mont. 
371, 34 P.(2d) 515; New Mexico: Seward v. Bowers (1933) 
37 N.M. 385, 24 P.(2d) 253; North Dakota: Stark v. City 
of Jamestown (1949) 37 N.W. (2d) 516; South Carolina: 
Cathcart v. Columbia ( 1933) 170 S. C. 362, 170 S. E. 435; 
Wyoming: Laverents v. City of Cheyenne (1950) 217 P. (2d) 
877. 
In addition to the foregoing authorities, a valuable note 
in 37 Columbia Law Review at page 210 lists the following 
jurisdictions as having disregarded the restricted special fund 
theory without express consideration of it: Arkansas; Iowa; 
Nebraska; New York; Oregon; Texas; Washington. 
The jurisdictions still adhering to the theory, besides 
Utah, are: South Dakota: Hesse v. City of Watertown (1930) 
57 S.D. 325, 232 N.W. 53, distinguished, however, in Robbins 
v. City of Rapid City, (S. D. 1946) 23 N. W. (2d) 144; 
Georgia: Dortch v. Southeastern Fair Association ( 1936) 182 
Ga. 633, 186 S. E. 685; Ohio: State ex rel. Public Institutional 
Building v. Griffith (1939) 135 0. St. 604, 22 N. E. (2d) 200. 
The cases in Alabama, Oklahoma and Wisconsin, cited 
in 3 7 Col. L. Review at page 210, seemingly in support of 
the theory can be distinguished on their facts. 
The overwhelming weight of authority is opposed to the 
restriction. The authorities are collected in 72 A.L.R. 687; 
96 A.L.R. 1385; 146 A.L.R. 328. 
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Theoretically, the restricted special fund theory is unsound 
when applied to a state case. Constitutional limitations on in-
debtedness have reference to obligations which must be paid 
from tax levies. A purely moral obligation does not have to 
be paid from a tax levy. Trust funds donated to the university 
should not in justice relieve the state of its obligation to sup-
port the institution. The expenditure of such trust funds 
should, therefore, neither impose or enhance the obligations 
resting upon the taxpayers. At most all the taxpayer loses 
is a subsidy he was not entitled to have in the first place. 
Grossman v. Public Water Supply District No. 1 (1936) 339 
Mo. 344, 96 S. W. (2d) 701. 
POINT NO.4 
THE UNIVERSITY'S LAND-GRANT INTEREST 
MAY LAWFULLY BE USED FOR THE ERECTION OF 
BUILDINGS. 
The land-grants to the University from the federal gov-
ernment are contained in Sections 8 and 12 of the Enabling 
Act. Since the grants in Section 12 are for the establishment 
and maintenance of a School of Mines and State Normal Schools 
it is s~lf -evident that none of the interest from those grants can 
be utilized to construct a dormitory. 
It will be noted that the grants under Section 8, authorized 
by the Act of February 21, 1855, to be reserved for the 
establishment of the University of Utah, are granted to the 
State of Utah for university purposes * * * and the income 
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thereof to be used exclusively for the purposes of such university 
* * * . Section 5, Art. X of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah says that the proceeds of the sale of said lands shall 
be safely invested and the income thereof be used exclusively 
for the support and maintenan~e of the university rrin accord-
ance with the requirements and conditions ofsaid Acts of Con-
gress." 
Roach v. Gooding, 11 Ida. 244, 81 Pac. 642, construing 
Section 5 of the Idaho Admission Bill (corresponding to Sec-
tion 10 of the Enabling Act of the State of Utah) held that 
it modified Section 8 of said Admission Bill (corresponding 
to Section 8 of the Enabling Act of the State of Utah) and 
that consequently .income from university lands could not be 
used to construct a domestic science building, said income being 
restricted to current expense purposes.- State ex rel. Blume v. 
State Board of Education, 97 Mont. 371, 34 P. (2d) 515, 
distinguishing the Roach case, and refusing to admit that the 
Enabling Act provision of Montana, corresponding to Utah's 
Section 10, affected Montana's provision corresponding to 
Utah's Section 8, had no difficulty in allowing the income 
from university lands to be used for building purposes. Justice 
Frick in State ex rel. University of Utah v. Candland, 36 U. 
at page 421 said: 
'·In view of the express provtstons of Section 8, 
supra, relating to the University of Utah, we assume 
that the general provisions contained in Section 10 
just referred to were not intended to apply to the 
proceeds derived from the sale of lands granted for 
university purposes, and we shall proceed upon such 
an assumption." 
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A men's dormitory certainly is for a university purpose as 
contemplated by Section 8 of our Enabling Act and since the 
phrase "for the support and maintenance" in Section 5, Art. 
X of the Constitution of the State of Utah is modified by the 
further provision "in accordance with the requirements and 
conditions of said Acts of Congress" no argument can be 
made that the interest from the university lands must be used 
solely for current expenses. However, in Arnold v. Bond, 
(Wyo. 1934) the court held that even the word "support" 
construed broadly would permit the erection of buildings. 
See also Merrill v. Spencer, 14 U. 273, 46 Pac. 1096. 
POINT NO.5 
THE BOARD OF REGENTS, AS THEN CONSTI-
TUTED, HAD FULL POWER AND AUTHORITY TO 
CONTRACT WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FOR 
THE LOAN IN QUESTION. 
Admitting for the sake of argument, that Section 4, Art. 
X of the Constitution of the State of Utah "froze" the con-
stituency of the Board of Regents beyond legislative amend-
ment so that the Board as now constituted is not composed of 
de jure officers, nevertheless it is composed of de facto officers 
actually engaged in conducting the affairs of the institution. 
In Smith v. Town of Carolina Beach, 206 N.C. 834, 175 S.E. 
313, an attempt was made to restrain a bond issue by town 
officers admittedly only de facto officials. Held that the author-
ity of the de facto officials could not be questioned except in 
a direct proceedings. And a case note in III Geo. Wash. Law 
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Review 265 commenting on the holding concurs in the opinion 
that the acts of a de facto official "whether completed or past, 
or contemplated for the future, should be subject to attack only 
by the state in a direct proceedings." 
The status of the Board of Trustees of the Utah State 
Agricultural College was questioned in the recent case of 
Spence v. Utah State Agricultural, 225 P. (2d) 18. It was held 
that the Board "is legally constituted." 
WILLIAM H. LEARY, 
of Counsel 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General 
ALLEN B. SORENSEN, 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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